Decision making after the use of radiological dispersion devices

Frank Hardeman

    Research outputpeer-review


    In the present situation, it is to be expected that an attack using a radiological dispersion device is possible, if not probable. Where or when it will happen remains of course very uncertain, but preparedness is primordial, if an adequate response is to be given. This paper will not include aspects of protection of highly active encapsulated sources; aspects of transport security; prevention and response in a context of improvised nuclear devices; proliferation issues at the level of states; risks and consequences of attacks upon nuclear facilities or clean-up and remediation strategies. It focuses on a few remaining issues: an adequate response after an attack with a radiological dispersion device (RDD), with focus upon public health, reassurance and limitation of public disruption, and secondly on a comparison between an adequate response in case of an RDD as compared to a 'normal' radiological or nuclear accident related to a facility.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationCountering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
    EditorsSamuel Apikyan, David Diamond
    Place of PublicationDordrecht, Netherlands
    Number of pages11
    ISBN (Print)1402048971, 9781402048975
    StatePublished - 2006

    Publication series

    NameNATO Security through Science Series B: Physics and Biophysics
    ISSN (Print)1871-465X

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Biotechnology
    • Biophysics
    • Nuclear and High Energy Physics
    • Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous)

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