TY - JOUR
T1 - Safety, dose optimisation and security : the quadrature of the circle.
AU - Hardeman, Frank
AU - Vermeersch, Fernand
A2 - van der Meer, Klaas
N1 - Score = 10
PY - 2010/2/1
Y1 - 2010/2/1
N2 - The growing concern for potential terrorist acts has lead to a number of new ideas about storing radiological and nuclear materials that are not always compatible with existing practices or infrastructures. As such, the management of nuclear safety, radiological protection and security within an evolving world such as a nuclear research centre sometimes looks like implementing the quadrature of the circle. Just a few examples. First: infrastructure related problems: from a security point of view, fuel storages or radioactive sources are better stored in the heart of a well protected zone, while in case of criticality, fire, etc. a more peripheral location is more appropriate. Strong protection infrastructure may lead to difficulties of evacuation in case of
emergencies. Second: safety related problems: access limitations to some areas may be a burden in the management of safety interventions, maintenance, etc. Third: administrative contradictions: inventories of fuel storages and high active sealed sources are a cornerstone of inspections and verifications; yet, this information is also a treasure for terrorists aiming at actions to obtain special materials. Fourth: dose management: some of the measures taken to secure sources may lead to an increase in dose (e.g. labelling of old sources).
AB - The growing concern for potential terrorist acts has lead to a number of new ideas about storing radiological and nuclear materials that are not always compatible with existing practices or infrastructures. As such, the management of nuclear safety, radiological protection and security within an evolving world such as a nuclear research centre sometimes looks like implementing the quadrature of the circle. Just a few examples. First: infrastructure related problems: from a security point of view, fuel storages or radioactive sources are better stored in the heart of a well protected zone, while in case of criticality, fire, etc. a more peripheral location is more appropriate. Strong protection infrastructure may lead to difficulties of evacuation in case of
emergencies. Second: safety related problems: access limitations to some areas may be a burden in the management of safety interventions, maintenance, etc. Third: administrative contradictions: inventories of fuel storages and high active sealed sources are a cornerstone of inspections and verifications; yet, this information is also a treasure for terrorists aiming at actions to obtain special materials. Fourth: dose management: some of the measures taken to secure sources may lead to an increase in dose (e.g. labelling of old sources).
KW - safety
KW - dose optimisation
KW - security
UR - http://ecm.sckcen.be/OTCS/llisapi.dll/open/ezp_104536
UR - http://knowledgecentre.sckcen.be/so2/bibref/6801
M3 - Article
SN - 1270-9441
VL - 2010
SP - 13
EP - 18
JO - European ALARA Newsletter
JF - European ALARA Newsletter
IS - Special Issue 1
ER -